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International Sporting Events and Human Trafficking: Effects of Mega-Events on a State's Capacity to Address Human Trafficking

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ABSTRACT

Recent literature has suggested that a state's being awarded the title of host for the Olympics or FIFA's World Cup can increase bilateral trade flows (Rose & Spiegel, 2011) and their political status (Rhamey & Early, 2013). Another potential side effect of these large-scale events is the increase in sex tourism and human trafficking. The influx of visitors to a host state is thought to increase demand on the local sex industry. Similarly, the need to build new stadia and infrastructure arguably increases the likelihood that trafficked labor will be utilized. This article examines the record of host states in addressing human trafficking as compared to a global sample. The findings suggest that international sporting event hosts (FIFA World Cup and Olympics) are positively affected by these events when it comes to prosecuting human traffickers, but Olympic states are negatively affected in the dimension of trafficking prevention. This suggests that the Olympics produce varying demands on a state that can increase the demand for trafficked individuals.

Introduction

In the past decade, there has been significant attention paid to the connection between human trafficking and large-scale sporting events. From the Super Bowl in the United States to the global Olympic and FIFA World Cup events, the matter has been examined by legal scholars (Hayes, 2010), criminologists (Shelley, 2010), and nongovernmental organization (NGO) experts (Ham, 2011). These authors and many like them have particularly focused on trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation. In theory, these events attract large numbers of visitors to a nation or city, driving up demand on the local sex industry (legal or otherwise). This creates a favorable environment for human traffickers to operate within. Yet, the demand for new infrastructure these events create can result in the trafficking of low-skilled workers. One need only examine the case of the 2022 Qatar World Cup where it is estimated that one Nepalese worker dies every two days in construction work for the games (Gibson & Pattisson, 2014). Many of these workers toiled in conditions described by International Trade Union Confederation President Sharan Burrow as "simply slavery" (as quoted in Wilson, 2015).

Including the most recent international sporting events (the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, Russia, and the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil), six of the next eight of these "mega-events" will be hosted in a less than fully democratic state.Grix (2013, p. 16) says seven of the next eight events as he lists South Korea as an emerging democracy. This is not necessarily a new phenomenon; the Olympics were held in the Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, and prereform South Korea during the Cold War when tensions between the East and West were at their greatest. Nor is it necessarily the International Olympic Committee's (IOC, who selects the host cities for the

Olympics) or the Federation Internationale de Football Association's (FIFA, who selects the soccer World Cup hosts) responsibility to make political decisions. In fact, both organizations are eager to highlight their nonpolitical nature (as nonprofits). Yet, each organization's stated mission uses the language of rights and international liberalism (Beacom, 2012; Nold, 2014; Tomlinson, 2014).

To date, the quantitative evidence of increased trafficking during these large, international sporting events has been scant. This is largely due to poor data as a result of both the difficulty of uncovering much of this activity and a confused judicial system that, even when it has uncovered trafficking, will often misaddress the issue. This article looks at international sporting-event hosts and their performance on human trafficking using a new measure developed by Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer (2014). Far from seeking to answer whether or not these events in and of themselves increase trafficking, as the data simply do not exist to do that, I examine the performance of host nations in relation to a global sample. Are host nations better or worse at addressing human trafficking? And what information can we glean from these results regarding trafficking?

The article is divided into four sections. The literature contains an examination of the contemporary scholarly work in both the mega-event and human-trafficking literature and a presentation of the hypothesis based on this literature. This is followed by the methods section with an examination of the data and models used to test the expectations. After providing further analysis of the results and a discussion on implications, the article concludes with some remarks on the findings and suggestions for future work.

Literature review

Human trafficking

As defined by the United Nations in the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (herein the Palermo Protocol), trafficking includes the following:

> [T]he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat of use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving of receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. (United Nations, 2000, Article 3, Paragraph a[1])

Exploitation, according to the United Nations, refers to both exploitation for sexual or labor purposes. While certainly providing a broad definition, as a universal catchall, this definition is liable to be functionally vague and other terms are often needed to supplement it. One especially prevalent term is human smuggling or the act of smuggling individuals illegally across international borders. Unlike trafficking, when an individual is smuggled to their destination, their relationship with the smuggler ends (Kangaspunta, 2003, p. 83). Often though, those individuals who believe they are being smuggled will end up being exploited by their traffickers as indentured servants or sex slaves (Shelley, 2010, p. 110; see also Cullen-DuPont, 2009).

Human trafficking is a growing segment of international crime. As Shelley (2010, pp. 2–3) notes, this is largely because it is a high-reward, low-risk undertaking. The policy subsystem, or collection of actors and institutions that focuses on a specific policy problem (Sabatier, 1988), that has emerged to address human trafficking has had mixed success. While treaties like the Palermo Protocol and various domestic legislation have emerged, there is very little conformity of these policies across states and often even within states. This is because, as Claudio (2004) explains, trafficking is often treated simultaneously as a security threat and a humanitarian problem. Often the results are a criminal justice system that works across purposes; women trafficked into the sex industry are often arrested as illegal immigrants and lose their victim status (Claudio, 2004, p. 262).

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[1]http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/ProtocolTraffickingInPersons.aspx

Variances across domestic policies can threaten the continuity of international efforts to subdue trafficking but then so too can international economic and security policies. For instance, Shelley (2010, p. 199) discusses how at the same time the EU sought to reduce human trafficking from Moldova that its agricultural policies were actually increasing trafficking by damaging the Moldavian economy and driving individuals to seek a better existence elsewhere. There are a multitude of externalities associated with policies and the increase of human trafficking. Where one source state strengthens its laws, another state is at increased risk of its citizens being trafficked; where a destination state strengthens its laws, another state is likely to become a prime destination (Cho et al., 2014, p. 5).

Since its inception in 2000, the Palermo Protocol has, at a minimum, provided a series of standards by which to judge a state's overall performance in addressing human trafficking. Despite whatever differences in domestic policies might exist, the protocol will judge states on their ability to prevent trafficking, prosecute traffickers, and protect victims of trafficking: The 3Ps (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2006, pp. 12–13). Each aspect of the 3Ps, while encouraging the engagement of NGOs and the formation of information networks, is heavily reliant on the state and its capabilities. This tends to result in more criminal justice responses to trafficking that emphasize state authority as it extends formal powers, unlike treating trafficking as a human rights issue that would challenge that power (Simmons, Charnyth, & Lloyd, 2015, p. 15).

The UNODC releases reports that score states based on their performance in these areas. The standards by which a state either complies or is in arrears with its 3P duties are superficially logical. For instance, a state that has implemented and continues to enforce domestic laws that punish traffickers is likely to be viewed as meeting the expectations of prosecution under the protocol. Yet, so much of a state's performance relies on what it is doing or has done for the victims of trafficking. The UNODC's (2006) report informs the reader that a state needs to "provide for the physical safety of victims following rescue" and to "adopt measures that permit victims to remain in the territory, temporarily or permanently" as part of their satisfaction of the protection of victims (p. 13). Yet, because many trafficking victims are discovered when occupying an illegal trade (either as undocumented, unskilled labor or as sex workers), they are often liable to be treated as criminals and deported. This can result in a tautological definition of who is and is not a victim with the qualifying characteristics being wholly determined by the various states' criminal codes.

It is also difficult to separately identify victims of human trafficking from voluntary, legal, and illegal immigrants. Trafficking patterns will often mirror legitimate migratory patterns (Musto, 2009, p. 282). In the same way that individuals legitimately seek ingress into the world's financial and commercial capitals, so too do individuals seek to illegitimately enter these places. There are also shared characteristics of both victims and migrants in that they each voluntarily leave their source country in search of a better life (Musto, 2009, p. 282). It is often in route that the voluntary smuggling becomes the involuntary trafficking for exploitative purposes.

Beyond the issues of definitions surrounding who is and who is not a victim, the UNODC's reports are heavily biased towards sex trafficking as opposed to labor trafficking. Goodey (2008) notes that, because the UNODC report uses a content analysis of news items to create its score, and as sex-trafficking dominates media attention it is likely that the report overemphasizes this aspect. The report itself is quick to remind the reader that it "analyzes the extent of reporting of human trafficking flows, which may or may not adequately reflect the actual severity of trafficking in persons in any one country" (UNODC, 2006, p. 47). Ultimately, the UNODC's scores are reflective of (a) a subjective, tautological definition of victims and (b) an exaggeration of, or overemphasis on, sex trafficking as the sum of a state's performance in addressing human trafficking.

International sporting events

International sporting events of the sort the Olympics and FIFA World Cup represent are often referred to as mega-events. These tend to require the use of public funds and a public-policy initiative as their size dwarfs the professional conferences more common in, and familiar to, most

large cities (Olds, 1998). They are also categorically different from hallmark events, like New Orleans' Mardi Gras or the Tour de France, which do not migrate from city to city or nation to nation (Hall, 1992): They are a hallmark of the location. Therefore, the title of Olympic or World Cup host needs to be sought by nations and awarded by the IOC or FIFA.

Early work by Selwood and Hall (1988) noted a link between these events and an increase in prostitution. While trafficking was not discussed in this particular examination of the America's Cup in Perth, Australia, there were references to an increased presence of East Asian sex workers. There also tends to be an increase in minor crimes (public drunkenness and vandalism in particular) associated mostly with the visiting spectators (Hall, 1992, p. 79). Attendees to these events are often unlike "typical" tourists (Preuss, 2005, p. 282). Mazitelli (as quoted in Hall, 1992, p. 45) finds that sports tourists tend to stay at their destinations longer and spend more with the largest of these expenses tending to be travel to the event itself (Collins, Jones, & Munday, 2009, p. 832).

By 2006 and the FIFA World Cup in Germany, the connection between sporting events and trafficking was taken for granted. There were fears that this event could encourage sex tourism, a practice that has largely been made illegal internationally. Germany's legalized sex industry and an influx of sports fans, advocates argued, would lead to increased demands for sex workers that would need to be served through trafficked victims. While the source of the figure remains questionable, there were fears that nearly 40,000 women would be trafficked into Germany (Hayes, 2010, p. 1124). The U.S. Congress heard from human-trafficking advocates like Julia Ormond and urged Germany to outlaw prostitution during the event (U.S. Congress, 2006).

Yet, after the event, the German police could only identify five human-trafficking cases that were directly related to the World Cup (Hayes, 2010, p. 1126). There was little evidence of the predicted 40,000 victims. In fact, according to a 2011 Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women (GAATW), neither Germany, nor Greece (2004 Summer Olympics), nor South Africa (2010 World Cup), nor Canada (2010 Winter Olympics) experienced the predicted increase in human trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation[2] (Ham, 2011, p. 8). Writing for GAATW, Ham states, regarding the relationship between sporting events and human trafficking, that

> Human trafficking is a very serious human rights violation that demands a sustained and holistic response based on real evidence. We are concerned that valuable resources and public momentum are being channeled towards a false link between sporting events and trafficking for prostitution, resources that are needed elsewhere. (Ham, 2001, p. 8)

There is very little research that suggests international sporting events and sex trafficking are significantly linked. Shelley (2010, pp. 245, 256, 258) references a link between sports and human trafficking three times but leaves these points uncited or unsubstantiated. Hayes (2010) provides accounts of Greece, Germany, and China's international sports event experiences and ultimately states that "[r]ecent world sporting events did not experience the expected influx of human trafficking for commercial sexual exploitation," yet, while the evidence is scarce, "the rationale for fear is logical" (Hayes, 2010, p. 1105).

Sport tourism studies have largely centered on examples of poor behavior (Weed & Bull, 2004) and have likely exaggerated the less than favorable aspects of large sporting events. This is especially so when one considers the dearth of social science focused on soccer hooligans. Dunning, Murphy, and Williams (1988) argue that the exaggerated presence of hooligans in research is likely a result of their exaggerated status in English politics after 1966. In fact, Weed's (2008) examination of Olympic tourists find that many families and individuals are drawn to the event because of its prestigious nature. Tavella (2008) also relays that there were many families present in Germany in 2006 but also that there was "speculation that World Cup fans did not have the time, money[3] or inclination to visit prostitutes" (p. 215).

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[2]Press accounts from the 2014 World Cup report that Brazilian officials found a decrease in overall prostitution during its World Cup experience as well (Stern, 2014).
[3]See also Kim and Chalip (2004).

Kurtzman and Zauhar (2005) write that the "needs" of a sports tourist run horizontally and not hierarchically. This means that opportunity and convenience will largely define the services and products these individuals search out. Two studies of interest here come from the field of public health. Deering et al.'s (2012) examination of the 2010 Winter Games in Vancouver and Richter, Luchters, Ndlovu, Temmerman, and Cherisich's (2012) examination of the 2010 Soccer World Cup in South Africa. Both studies surveyed active sex workers in the periods around these events, and both reported a *decrease* in overall levels of prostitution.

Deering et al. (2012) find that police harassment of sex workers was up during the Olympic period in Vancouver. This finding is echoed by the South African sex workers in the Richter et al. (2012) study, but this explanation is reported as statistically insignificant. It is likely that the increased police presence could have dissuaded even those visitors who would have wished to find sex workers or, in the language of Kurtzman and Zauhar (2005), reduced the opportunity and convenience of having done so. The South African government in fact cited a decrease in overall crime (2.4%) including sexual offenses (4.4%) and attributes these results to increased police visibility due to the World Cup (South African Police Service [SAPS], 2010/2011, pp. 1, 6, 7).

While increased police presence might deter consumers, it would likely also be noticed by traffickers. Mega-events are, especially today, highly securitized. Particularly noticeable following the September 11th attacks, mega-event security has become a high-tech endeavor and even a part of the "spectacle" themselves (Boyle & Haggerty, 2009, p. 263). Congregations of ticketless fans in these cities are a major concern and draw lots of attention from security forces (Giulianotti & Klauser, 2010, p. 52). Further, the improved technologies and overt presence of security personnel cannot be missed. Boyle and Haggerty (2009, p. 264) note the oft seen surface-to-air missile installation that sat between TV broadcasters and the famous Bird's Nest stadium in Beijing during the 2008 Summer Olympics.

Event security could certainly deter or otherwise dissuade would-be traffickers from falling on a mega-event host city. While this is a plausible explanation for the unsubstantiated growth in sex trafficking, there is another, often overlooked form of trafficking that has some recent, substantiated connection to mega-events. Labor trafficking and exploitation has been associated with the 2014 Russian Games (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 2013) and, most egregiously, with the 2022 Qatar World Cup where two workers are estimated to die every week building infrastructure for that event (Gibson & Pattisson, 2014).

The exploitation of trafficked workers tends to be the lesser focus of the trafficking community. Many nations have formally equated human trafficking solely with sex trafficking. The United States, for instance, has a trafficking regime focused primarily on sex trafficking (Musto, 2009, p. 282). Trafficked workers are largely treated as criminals in this environment, particularly as disdain for immigration increased through the early 2000s (Farrell & Fahy, 2009, p. 622). Yet, following Hurricane Katrina, labor exploitation was common in the rebuilding of New Orleans (Shelley, 2010, p. 253).

That labor exploitation could be more prevalent than sexual exploitation at these events is not too great a stretch of logic, particularly as one examines the political and economic factors that often go into hosting a mega-event like the Olympics or World Cup. These are high-profile, zero-sum rewards to the winning host nation and city. They are also, according to Jennings (2013), a "source of democratic deficits, excluding citizens from participation in decision-making processes, and further contributing to social and economic inequalities in the distribution of risk and benefits" (pp. 3–4).

In 2004, Greece spent $1.5 billion on security alone for the Summer Games (Matheson, 2006, p. 3); Russia's 2014 Winter Games are said to have exceeded $50 billion in total (Yaffa, 2014). How states deal with these costs will differ. Although it is common for increased corporate patronage to saddle much of the burden, public monies are also largely directed towards these events. Reducing costs is important to both the democratic leader (who seeks to minimize taxes) and the autocrat (who would seek to increase private goods). This "consumer" explanation largely answers for what sustains the market for trafficked labor: employer profit seeking and consumers seeking minimized expenses (Cullen-DuPont, 2009, p. 27).

Theoretical development

Unfortunately, testing whether or not hosts of these events see an increase in human trafficking is rather difficult. Again, trafficked victims represent a "hidden population" (Musto, 2009, p. 282), their numbers are largely unknown. And what numbers do exist are often designed for the purpose of advocacy (Cho et al., 2014, p. 2). Specifically regarding the data connecting mega-events and sex trafficking, Hayes (2010) states that it is "highly manufactured for use as tools in morally charged campaigns about the nature of prostitution" (p. 1107).

That is not to say that a test of whether or not a state's performance in addressing human trafficking cannot be made and some information gleaned from this. The Palermo Protocol, as mentioned above, lays out three aspects that a state can be judged by in relation to its efforts in addressing trafficking. Does a state have and does it enforce laws that punish traffickers? Does a state act to reduce the sourcing and/or delivery of people within its borders? Does a state provide the physical and psychological care and security the victims of trafficking require?

If a state can positively address the 3Ps than it would be viewed by the UNODC as meeting its expectations under the Palermo Protocol. Yet, what of those years when a state is in the extra-ordinary position of an international sporting event host? As the above literature has demonstrated the expectations of trafficking victims flooding an event have not been substantiated, yet that is not to say that there is *no* increase. In fact, although the claims of 40,000 victims in 2006 proved unfounded, authors such as Tavella (2008) still note that many linkages between trafficking and mega-events still exist. This is especially so if we consider the often under studied area of labor trafficking and event construction.

Although testing the performance of a state in addressing trafficking during an international sporting event cannot address counts or overall levels of trafficking at the time of said event, this article will work from the closest approximation to the popular expectation that host states see increased trafficking. That is,

Hypothesis: When a state is selected to host an international sporting event, its effectiveness at addressing human trafficking will decrease.

Again, it would be incorrect to assume that the tests below would indicate overall levels of trafficking, but we can assume that a negative response across the 3P measures is likely indicative of relative, increased trafficking based on the expectations of the Palermo Protocols. That is, if a state allows traffickers to act with impunity, is not decreasing the demand for trafficked peoples or is not providing adequate services to trafficking victims, then traffickers likely have an easier time sourcing and delivering trafficked people. Compared to states that do perform well on these measures, we can expect states with poorer 3P scores to have increased relative levels of trafficking.

As Hayes (2010) was quoted above, there is a great deal of superficial validity to the hypothesis that these events are attended by increased trafficking, particularly if one expands trafficking to include both sex and labor trafficking. On the one hand, the labor would be welcomed by event organizers and contractors in that it would keep costs low and profits high. Wheaton, Schauer, and Galli (2009) present a formal model that supports this logic. Further, it is likely that in the increased atmosphere of construction, identifying trafficked labor would be more difficult. Sex trafficking, on the other hand, would likely benefit from the strained resources that will be needed with the increased demand mega-events bring. Law enforcement and other officials will likely have their attention focused on the event and event-related incidents. And even where authorities can focus on trafficking, the large influx of visitors will make it that much more difficult to identify trafficking victims.

Methodology

The dependent variable, the 3P measure, is a 1–5 index on a state's compliance with the Palermo Protocol for trafficking prosecutions, the prevention of trafficking, and protections from trafficking compiled by Cho et al. (2014). A state scores a 5 when it is in full compliance with the Palermo Protocol, and a 1 when

it has no formal effort (Cho et al., 2014, p. 7). The overall, additive measure then ranges from 3 to 15, total non-compliance to full compliance on all three measures. These scores are based on raw data from the U. S. State Department and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

This measure is available for 177 nations, covering the years 2000 to 2012 in the country-year format, and has not been censored in any way. Instead of using the index score, the variable is differenced to capture the change in the score from year *t-1* to year *t*. This helps address any issues of nonstationarity that are likely to be associated with data of this nature. Further, to control for any time trends that may be unobserved, the models below include yearly-fixed effects.[4]

The independent variable is a country-year dummy; states are scored a 1 when they have been selected to host either the Olympics or World Cup (their adult variations as opposed to the Youth Olympics or Under-17 World Cup) and every year until and including the event. Most states are chosen 7 years prior to the event they will eventually host with few aberrations from this.[5] These were coded by the author from the IOC and FIFA histories available from their public Web sites. Later, this coding was checked against a similar set developed by Rose and Spiegel (2011). Dummy codes were created for each the summer and winter games and the men's and women's World Cup as well. A table of summary statistics for the key dependent and independent variables is located in Appendix Table A1.

Controls for this study are primarily familiar to the human-rights literature, but there are some advisable controls that are particularly important to human trafficking. In the vein of the Poe and Tate (1994) and Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999) studies, controls for specific state characteristics (gross domestic product [GDP], trade, and population) associated with rights performance are included. These are logged, country-year variables from the World Bank's (2014) World Development Indicators (WDI). The models also control for a state's level of judicial independence (Cingranelli, Richards, & Clay, 2014), or its ability to enforce laws without government interference, as well as its level of respect for property rights to address the relative strength of a state's rule of law.

Levels of corruption and weak state capacity are two more common features of high-traffic states. Often a nation's police or government officials are complicit in the trafficking of humans, if not organizing these actions for their own profit (Shelley, 2010, pp. 6–7, 47). Further, where no official presence exists, like porous borders or within weak, decentralized local governments, trafficking would also be likely to thrive. In other words, the foci of the Palermo Protocol (prosecution, protection, and prevention) are going to rely on a state's ability, its capacity, to see that these concepts can be fulfilled.

The Transparency International (Treisman, 2007) corruption perception index is employed to control for corruption within a state (Teorell et al., 2015). This measure ranges from 0 (*highly clean*) to 10 (*highly corrupt*) and is based on the perceptions of administrative and political corruption. There are several variables that have been examined when trying to capture state capacity (see Hendrix, 2010). Having included controls for corruption and judicial independence, I use an International Monetary Fund (2014, retrieved from Teorell et al., 2015) measure of government revenue to address bureaucratic strength. A state's ability to impose, but more so collect, taxes tends to be a reflection of bureaucratic strength.

Another common feature of states that have poor human-trafficking records are a lack of economic equality for women. Women in these states are more likely, because of their less advantaged economic position, forced to take riskier, less formal occupations like prostitution (Hayes, 2010, pp. 1111–1112; Shelley, 2010). This increases their risk of being forced into sex trafficking or sexual slavery. The models include the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) measure for women's economic rights to control for a state's level of gender equality. The CIRI (Cingranelli et al., 2014) measure is an index scored 0 (no political rights for women) to 3 (full rights guaranteed by law) from U.S. State Department and Amnesty International sources (Cingranelli & Richards, 2010).

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[4]These results have been placed in the Appendix in the order in which their corresponding model appears.
[5]The FIFA Women's World Cup was held in the United States in both 1999 and 2003 owing to the Bird Flu epidemic that forced FIFA to remove the latter event from China who would host the 2007 event instead. Because of this, the United States and China have extended hosting periods for the Women's World Cup.

Figure 1. Histogram of cases across overall 3P measure.

Further, a WDI measure of youth female unemployment is included. This captures the level of unemployment among women aged 15 to 24. Theoretically, higher levels of unemployment among this social cohort increase the pool from which sex workers might emerge. Selwood and Hall's (1988) study of the America's Cup found that there was an increase in locals entering the sex industry during the event. Therefore, high female unemployment in a host state likely *decreases* demand for trafficked workers.

Unfortunately, the 3P data only span 12 years (2000–2012). This means that there are few event host years (six different World Cup hosts, six Olympics). Even using the years-selected dummy, while it increases the occurrence of the explanatory variable, there remain few overall cases for which a state may be chosen host. The differenced dependent variable further truncates the observations and the available temporal scope. Observations for all models are 724 and the fully specified model covers the years 2002–2009; variance though is quite substantial across the sample when examining their overall 3P score as Figure 1 demonstrates.

Analysis

Because there are any number of reasons or combinations of reasons that can influence a state's ability to address the different aspects of human trafficking as outlined by the Palermo Protocol, tests of the hypothesis use an endogenous binary-variable model, or treatment regression model, for each type of mega-event. These models are appropriate because, while the outcome (changes in the 3P Index) is observable, they are not conditionally independent of the "treatment" (in this case the dummy variable for Olympic or World Cup host) (StataCorp, 2013). The results will demonstrate the average affect hosting an event has on a state's 3P performance as opposed to not.

Table 1 shows the model results regarding selection for the World Cup on a state's performance across the 3P measures. The World Cup is positively and significantly related to a state's level of prosecution. This result is opposite the predictions in the hypothesis; the other measures—protect, prevent, and the overall measure—do not reach statistical significance. The average treatment effect (ATE) being selected host produces on a World Cup state's prosecution of human traffickers is less than a full point change.

Table 2 shows the results of the same model, but the key explanatory variable is Olympic selection. Here, the coefficient for prosecution is positive and significant. Again, this is contrary to the hypothesis and suggests that hosting an Olympic game would increase a state's commitment to formal measures against human traffickers. Conversely, the coefficient for prevention is negative and significant. The Olympic models suggest that, at the very least, states who are hosting the Olympics are apt to either neglect their responsibilities to prevent trafficking or are unable to maintain an effective level of prevention during the host period. The ATE for each of these results is less than a full-point change.

Table 1. Treatment Effects: Hosting FIFA World Cup on the 3P Index.

	Prosecute	Protect	Prevent	Overall
Corruption	0.005	0.003	0.008	0.017
	(0.19)	(0.11)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Women's Rights	0.040	−0.022	0.031	0.047
	(0.92)	(−0.45)	(0.67)	(0.52)
Property Rights	−0.003	−0.001	−0.001	−0.006
	(−1.15)	(−0.56)	(−0.64)	(−1.17)
Unemployment (Youth Female)	−0.000	−0.000	0.001	0.000
	(−0.40)	(−0.14)	(0.80)	(0.04)
Independent Judiciary	0.023	0.060	0.040	0.124
	(0.48)	(1.10)	(0.81)	(1.25)
World Cup Host	0.700*	−0.019	0.156	0.063
	(2.25)	(−0.04)	(0.20)	(0.05)
Constant	0.124	0.449**	0.521***	1.134***
	(0.90)	(2.86)	(3.54)	(3.97)
Equation 2: World Cup Host Selection				
Log of Population	0.399*	0.356	0.361	0.359
	(2.05)	(1.86)	(1.85)	(1.87)
Log of GDP per Capita	0.065	0.089	0.082	0.086
	(0.36)	(0.46)	(0.41)	(0.44)
Log of Trade	−0.527	−0.860	−0.857	−0.863
	(−1.12)	(−1.80)	(−1.79)	(−1.81)
Government Revenue	0.009	0.004	0.004	0.004
	(0.47)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.24)
Constant	−2.242	−0.888	−0.880	−0.887
	(−0.80)	(−0.31)	(−0.31)	(−0.31)
athrho	−0.844**	0.002	−0.088	−0.103
	(−2.70)	(0.01)	(−0.16)	(−0.23)
lnsigma	−0.383***	−0.263***	−0.343***	0.328***
	(−13.78)	(−9.95)	(−12.89)	(12.34)
Chi^2	7.28	0.00	0.03	0.05
Prob>Chi^2	.007	.991	.872	.817
N	716	716	716	716

Note. T statistics in parentheses. Yearly fixed effects reported in Appendix Table A2.
*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

Not all of these events are equally as coveted by potential hosts. The Summer Games are typically thought of as the more prestigious, and Table 3 shows the results of models that test Summer and Winter Olympic host selection against the 3Ps.[6] The results show that there is largely a consistency across Olympic types, save for a Summer Games host's overall measure. Here, the ATE is approximately a negative two points, a fairly substantial change. This would seem to suggest that the larger, and often more expensive, Summer Games hosts are more likely to see their ability to address trafficking weakened.

Also, the men's soccer World Cup tends to be the larger, more coveted event for potential hosts than the women's variation. Table 4[7] shows the results of the same models, performed now with selection as men's World Cup host the treatment. The results are rather striking: Men's World Cup hosts perform positively across three of the four measures with protection being the sole dimension on which the coefficient does not reach statistical significance. Unfortunately, the same tests cannot be conducted on the women's event for which models cannot be fitted. For the period in which these models occur, the women's World Cup is dominated by the United States and China, and, in which case, it is likely there is little variance.

While the models above have addressed the selection effects that accompany hosting, they do not address the selection effects that occur with the decision to bid for an event. That is, while all states could potentially bid to host an event, only a few ever will. Table 5 presents the results of a model that test of bid states' (both those that will eventually be chosen host and those that will not)

[6]Full model results in the Appendix, Tables A4–A7.
[7]Full model results in the Appendix, Tables A8 and A9.

Table 2. Treatment Effects: Hosting Olympics on the 3P Index.

	Prosecute	Protect	Prevent	Overall
Corruption	−0.005	0.002	0.018	0.029
	(−0.20)	(0.08)	(0.62)	(0.50)
Women's Rights	0.039	−0.020	0.036	0.055
	(0.89)	(−0.40)	(0.77)	(0.60)
Property Rights	−0.003	−0.001	−0.001	−0.006
	(−1.17)	(−0.55)	(−0.51)	(−1.09)
Unemployment (Youth Female)	−0.001	−0.000	0.001	−0.001
	(−0.65)	(−0.13)	(0.68)	(0.17)
Independent Judiciary	0.017	0.060	0.037	0.118
	(0.37)	(1.11)	(0.74)	(1.20)
Olympic Host	0.675**	−0.018	−0.667**	−0.946
	(2.69)	(−0.06)	(−3.11)	(−1.40)
Constant	0.197	0.447**	0.488***	1.112***
	(1.44)	(2.84)	(3.39)	(3.93)
Equation 2: Olympic Host Selection				
Log of Population	0.355*	0.489**	0.440**	0.476**
	(2.26)	(3.13)	(3.23)	(3.17)
Log of GDP per Capita	0.676**	0.753***	0.782***	0.772***
	(3.23)	(3.41)	(3.71)	(3.61)
Log of Trade	−0.396	−0.276	−0.325	−0.194
	(−1.07)	(−0.71)	(−0.87)	(−0.52)
Government Revenue	0.036*	0.036*	0.039*	0.034*
	(2.49)	(2.16)	(2.36)	(2.15)
Constant	−8.864**	−10.55***	−10.57***	−10.96***
	(−3.20)	(−3.38)	(−3.68)	(−3.66)
athrho	−0.678*	0.029	0.711***	0.443
	(−2.48)	(0.13)	(3.46)	(1.41)
lnsigma	−0.380***	−0.263***	−0.326***	0.355***
	(−13.13)	(−9.95)	(−11.60)	(11.74)
Chi^2	6.16	0.02	11.95	2.00
Prob>Chi^2	.013	.894	.000	.157
N	716	716	716	716

Note. T statistics in parentheses. Yearly fixed effects reported in Appendix Table A3.
*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

Table 3. Treatment Effects: Hosting Summer and Winter Olympics on the 3P Index.

	Prosecute	Protect	Prevent	Overall
Summer Games	0.991***	−0.168	−0.729*	−1.991**
	(3.39)	(−0.23)	(−2.27)	(−2.76)
Winter Games	0.903***	0.055	−1.071***	−1.158
	(5.60)	(0.12)	(−5.15)	(−1.88)

Note. T statistics in parentheses. *$p < .05$. **$p < .001$. ***$p < .001$.

Table 4. Treatment Effects: Hosting Men's World Cup on the 3P Index.

	Prosecute	Protect	Prevent	Overall
Men's World Cup	0.893***	−0.037	0.778*	1.699**
	(5.10)	(−0.08)	(2.40)	(2.97)

Note. T statistics in parentheses. *$p < .05$. **$p < .001$. ***$p < .001$.

Table 5. Treatment Effects: Mega-Event Bid on the 3P Index.

	Prosecute	Protect	Prevent	Overall
Mega-Event Bid	0.961***	0.784	0.780**	1.983***
	(4.79)	(1.93)	(3.10)	(4.52)

Note. T statistics in parentheses. *$p < .05$. **$p < .001$. ***$p < .001$.

performance against the 3P measures. Bidding for an international sporting event has a positive and significant coefficient in all but the dimension of protection as demonstrated in Table 5.[8] This suggests that states who decide to bid also seek to do more to meet their 3P obligations.

That both sets of event models and the bid model return positive coefficients on the dimension of prosecution is perhaps more shallow than it is substantive. That is, the states that bid and ultimately win hosting duties are likely to have trafficking laws and actively enforce those laws. What this cannot address though is whether the active enforcement is facilitated by increased *opportunity* to enforce these laws due to increased trafficking. That is, a state that increases its prosecutions of traffickers from 10 to 100 from one year to the next might superficially appear to be improving, yet their efforts are actually stagnant if trafficking has increased tenfold as well. Without an understanding of the overall level of trafficking, the substantive measure of a state's commitment to its responsibility to prosecute traffickers will be difficult.

That there were no significant results in relation to protection should have perhaps been expected. Protection is likely related to a longer term social effort than these events are able to address. Government composition and levels of social spending are likely better predictors. It is also inherently related to the subjective definition of "victims" a state will employ, arguably making it the least objective of the three measures: A victim will inherently be whomever the state decides a victim is.

The more interesting finding is the negative influence having been selected to host the Olympics has on prevention. The bid and Olympic models suggests that there is a temporal element that needs be addressed. It could be that policy entrepreneurs are underselling costs and needed resources for these events and driving up the need for trafficked labor later to make up the losses. It might also be that the Olympics uniquely strain the state's utility including resources that were once devoted to prevention. Why only Olympic states though and not World Cup states?

Figure 2 shows the average quality of government rating[9] of Olympic (in blue) and World Cup (in red) hosts. While they vary over the years and the Olympic states tend to have a higher average, they are fairly comparable. This would suggest that superficially there is not much difference between a state that bids for an Olympic Games or World Cup. In fact, in the years that make up this model, Canada has been selected for one Olympic Games (winter 2010) and one World Cup (women's 2015); China is also a host for a women's World Cup (2007) and an Olympic Games (summer 2008);


Figure 2. Average quality of government rating of event hosts across time.

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[8]Full model results in the Appendix, Table A10.
[9]Use of this measure is meant to approximate the sum of a government's reliability and utility.

the United States also appears as an Olympic host (winter 2002) and a World Cup host (women's 2003).[10] That certain results vary between events then adds a measure of robustness to these as the source of unique political outcomes.

Future researchers might very well then find the answer in the differing bid books and host contracts between FIFA and the IOC. The most obvious difference between the two event types is that FIFA is hosted by several different cities in one nation, while the Olympics are hosted by one city. The cost sharing among multiple cities likely reduces the sort of opposition to a mega-event that Gursoy and Kendall (2006) have found cause "delays, legal action, and abandonment of projects" (p. 604). Delays and costly alterations to projects laid out in the bid phase could increase the desirability of cheap, trafficked labor as the event nears.

Per the protocol, a state seeking to meet its expectations of prevention should "undertake measures to discourage demand" (UNODC, 2006, p. 12) of exploited individuals. If, according to the theories above, a state would see increased levels of "demand," it is likely that they are also experiencing increased levels of trafficking. It would be helpful to keep in mind that the data could be reproducing the popular belief that trafficking increases during an international sporting event. Particularly as the source of these data include content analysis of reports on trafficking. It is likely a theme that reoccurs within many of these events and could result in oversampling. Why this oversampling would be isolated, or exaggerated, in relation to Olympic hosts would need to be explained.

Ultimately, while this study has attempted to address, quantitatively, an aspect of the relationship between sporting events and trafficking, any further advancements will greatly benefit from improved data. This is especially true of any data that can get researchers, advocates, and law enforcement closer to understanding the baseline level of trafficking. Besides the Cho et al. (2014) 3P measure applied here, Frank's (2013) Human Trafficking Index contains a country-year prosecution count but is available for few country years. These are extremely helpful resources that will continue to evolve and improve over time but are inherently hard to interpret relative to a hidden population.

Conclusion

The effects of hosting an international sporting event on a city and nation vary. By and large, the financial windfall is minimal if not negative (Matheson, 2006) and the political gains are largely diffuse (Jennings, 2013) and often only recognized in terms of soft power (Rhamey & Early, 2013). In recent years, autocracies and less developed countries have had an increased presence in the final rounds of the bidding process. Concurrently, there has been growing attention paid to human trafficking in relation to these events (Ham, 2011; Hayes, 2010): Do the increased visitors to a city or nation increase demand on the domestic sex industry, thus creating a need that can be serviced by traffickers?

This will likely be an issue for some time to come as the characteristics of these new, autocratic, and developing hosts are often found to be related to human trafficking. There has been little quantitative evidence to support the theory that these events see increased levels of human trafficking, and this article cannot claim to address whether or not trafficking increases as a result of international sporting events. In the end, this article has examined whether those measures that seek to address trafficking are affected by an international sport event. The results demonstrate that, by and large, there is a positive influence on prosecution for both Olympic and World Cup hosts, but the former sees an average negative influence on its prevention of trafficking. There were no statistically significant results related to the protection of victims, as aforementioned, likely due to the nature of this measure. These results should certainly be informative for any policy entrepreneurs and activists working this field and should help to make resource distribution more efficient.

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[10]Germany is also a host for two events, but both are World Cups: one the men's World Cup (2006) and one the women's World Cup (2011).

Future work will hopefully have the aid of better data; at that time, we might get closer to quantitatively understanding how these events and other phenomenon affect levels of trafficking. Qualitative scholars interested in this area of study should examine why specific areas of the 3P scores are reactive to a state's hosting an international sporting event. Are World Cup states conscious of the global attention and more willing to address trafficking? Does a state benefit economically in such a way to increase its overall capacity? Between the bid stage and hosting an event, what phenomena do Olympic states experience that decrease their capacity to prevent trafficking? The above findings and the answers to these questions will better inform the active community of anti-trafficking activists and advocates.

Human trafficking is an understudied aspect of both the human rights and international political economy subfields. Especially when no state is entirely immune from this activity. Scaled to their influence, international organizations like the IOC and FIFA are also vastly understudied. The goods they provide, these international sporting events, are inherently zero sum: Only one state at a time may host these extremely popular mega-events. This gives them significant influence over state behavior; arguably more than political science's traditional models of NGOs would expect them to have.

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Appendix

Table A1. Summary Statistics.

	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min/Max
Dependent Variables				
Prosecution	1762	3.60	1.21	1/5
Protection	1762	2.69	1.05	1/5
Prevention	1763	3.21	1.03	1/5
Overall	1762	9.51	2.77	3/15
Explanatory Variables				
World Cup Host	8214	0.15	0.12	0/1
Olympic Host	8214	0.18	0.13	0/1
Summer Host	8214	0.01	0.09	0/1
Winter Host	8214	0.01	0.09	0/1
Men's Cup Host	8214	0.01	0.10	0/1
Bid State	8214	0.01	0.10	0/1

Table A2. Yearly Fixed Effects: Hosting FIFA World Cup on the 3P Index.

	Prosecute	Protect	Prevent	Overall
2002	0.315*	−0.213	−0.282	−0.153
	(2.33)	(−1.30)	(−1.87)	(−0.53)
2003	0.278*	−0.361*	−0.767***	−0.827**
	(2.20)	(−2.39)	(−5.51)	(−3.09)
2004	0.049	−0.310*	−0.372**	−0.628*
	(0.40)	(−2.11)	(−2.74)	(−2.40)
2005	0.225	−0.319*	−0.470***	−0.551*
	(1.86)	(−2.20)	(−3.50)	(−2.15)
2006	0.000	−0.429**	−0.706***	−1.116***
	(0.00)	(−2.94)	(−5.24)	(−4.32)
2007	0.045	−0.397**	−0.610***	−0.944***
	(0.38)	(−2.73)	(−4.54)	(−3.67)
2008	−0.001	−0.326*	−0.427**	−0.739**
	(−0.01)	(−2.24)	(−3.17)	(−2.84)

Note. T statistics in parentheses.
*$p < 0.05$. **$p < 0.01$. ***$p < 0.001$.

Table A3. Yearly Fixed Effects: Hosting the Olympics on the 3P Index.

	Prosecute	Protect	Prevent	Overall
2002	0.351*	−0.213	−0.297*	−0.178
	(2.50)	(−1.30)	(−2.00)	(−0.61)
2003	0.290*	−0.361*	−0.767***	−0.863**
	(2.23)	(−2.40)	(−5.60)	(−3.20)
2004	0.011	−0.309*	−0.362**	−0.680**
	(0.09)	(−2.11)	(−2.71)	(−2.58)
2005	0.204	−0.318*	−0.477***	−0.608*
	(1.63)	(−2.20)	(−3.61)	(−2.33)
2006	−0.012	−0.428**	−0.696***	−1.157***
	(−0.10)	(−2.93)	(−5.24)	(−4.42)
2007	0.021	−0.396**	−0.608***	−1.002***
	(0.17)	(−2.72)	(−4.59)	(−3.82)
2008	−0.031	−0.325*	−0.423**	−0.739**
	(−0.25)	(−2.23)	(−3.19)	(−2.84)

Note. T statistics in parentheses.
*$p < 0.05$. **$p < 0.01$. ***$p < 0.001$.

Table A4. Hosting Summer Olympics on the 3P Index.

	Prosecute	Protect	Prevent	Overall
Corruption	−0.002	0.002	0.015	0.033
	(−0.08)	(0.09)	(0.51)	(0.56)
Women's Rights	0.042	−0.020	0.029	0.046
	(0.96)	(−0.40)	(0.64)	(0.51)
Property Rights	−0.003	−0.001	−0.001	−0.007
	(−1.17)	(−0.52)	(−0.63)	(−1.21)
Unemployment (Youth Female)	−0.001	−0.000	0.001	−0.001
	(−0.68)	(−0.12)	(0.68)	(0.20)
Independent Judiciary	0.018	0.061	0.036	0.114
	(0.39)	(1.13)	(0.73)	(1.15)
Summer Olympic Host	0.991***	−0.168	−0.729*	−1.991**
	(3.39)	(−0.23)	(−2.27)	(−2.76)
Constant	0.179	0.460**	0.529***	1.180***
	(1.34)	(2.98)	(3.73)	(4.26)
Equation 2: Summer Olympic Host Selection				
Log of Population	0.012	0.045	0.069	0.081
	(0.08)	(0.34)	(0.47)	(0.55)
Log of GDP per Capita	0.450*	0.494*	0.647*	0.676**
	(2.09)	(2.09)	(2.48)	(2.58)
Log of Trade	−0.999*	−1.007*	−0.942*	−0.709
	(−2.16)	(−2.02)	(−1.96)	(−1.48)
Government Revenue	0.023	0.012	0.016	0.013
	(1.28)	(0.64)	(0.80)	(0.70)
Constant	−2.928	−3.094	−5.024	−6.212
	(−1.03)	(−0.99)	(−1.53)	(−1.77)
athrho	−0.802**	−0.019	0.728**	0.836*
	(−2.83)	(−0.05)	(2.69)	(2.32)
lnsigma	−0.387***	−0.269***	−0.336***	0.339***
	(−13.93)	(−10.22)	(−12.13)	(11.85)
Chi^2	8.02	0.00	7.25	5.38
Prob>Chi^2	.004	.964	.007	.020
N	724	724	724	724

Note. T statistics in parentheses.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Table A5. Summer Olympics Yearly Fixed Effects.

	Prosecute	Protect	Prevent	Overall
2002	0.359*	−0.213	−0.285	−0.181
	(2.53)	(−1.31)	(−1.91)	(−0.62)
2003	0.278*	−0.363*	−0.767***	−0.871**
	(2.13)	(−2.41)	(−5.56)	(−3.20)
2004	0.012	−0.310*	−0.355**	−0.669*
	(0.10)	(−2.11)	(−2.64)	(−2.58)
2005	0.209	−0.320*	−0.468***	−0.600*
	(1.67)	(−2.21)	(−3.52)	(−2.32)
2006	−0.008	−0.429**	−0.700***	−1.163***
	(−0.07)	(−2.94)	(−5.23)	(−4.47)
2007	0.026	−0.396**	−0.605***	−1.007***
	(0.21)	(−2.73)	(−4.53)	(−3.86)
2008	−0.025	−0.325*	−0.423**	−0.800**
	(−0.20)	(−2.23)	(−3.17)	(−3.06)

Note. T statistics in parentheses.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Table A6. Hosting Winter Olympics on the 3P Index.

	Prosecute	Protect	Prevent	Overall
Corruption	−0.004	0.003	0.013	0.023
	(−0.26)	(0.11)	(0.43)	(0.39)
Women's Rights	0.040	−0.024	0.044	0.057
	(0.91)	(−0.49)	(0.95)	(0.63)
Property Rights	−0.003	−0.001	−0.001	−0.006
	(−1.17)	(−0.56)	(−0.50)	(−1.10)
Unemployment (Youth Female)	−0.001	−0.000	0.001	−0.001
	(−0.65)	(−0.16)	(0.87)	(−0.09)
Independent Judiciary	0.017	0.059	0.042	0.123
	(0.37)	(1.10)	(0.84)	(1.25)
Winter Olympic Host	0.903***	0.055	−1.071***	−1.158
	(5.60)	(0.12)	(−5.15)	(−1.88)
Constant	0.196	0.467**	0.516***	1.158***
	(1.47)	(3.02)	(3.65)	(4.17)
Equation 2: Winter Olympic Host Selection				
Log of Population	0.498**	0.797**	0.803***	0.803**
	(2.69)	(3.25)	(3.78)	(3.48)
Log of GDP per Capita	0.882**	0.895**	0.907*	0.871**
	(2.88)	(2.58)	(3.52)	(2.79)
Log of Trade	0.063	0.315	0.120	0.406
	(0.14)	(0.57)	(0.25)	(0.79)
Government Revenue	0.056**	0.062*	0.073**	0.061*
	(2.80)	(2.28)	(2.99)	(2.39)
Constant	−14.43***	−17.04***	−16.83***	−17.16***
	(−3.58)	(−3.35)	(−4.17)	(3.69)
athrho	−1.127***	0.005	1.164***	0.571
	(−5.67)	(0.02)	(4.09)	(1.85)
lnsigma	−0.384***	−0.268***	−0.329***	0.330***
	(−14.22)	(−10.20)	(−12.04)	(12.04)
Chi^2	32.17	0.00	16.71	3.42
$\text{Prob}>\text{Chi}^2$	.000	.984	.000	.064
N	724	724	724	724

Note. T statistics in parentheses.
*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

Table A7. Winter Olympics Yearly Fixed Effects.

	Prosecute	Protect	Prevent	Overall
2002	0.314*	−0.212	−0.312*	−0.180
	(2.24)	(−1.30)	(−1.91)	(−0.61)
2003	0.305*	−0.361*	−0.768***	−0.868**
	(2.35)	(−2.39)	(−5.60)	(−3.21)
2004	0.013	−0.310*	−0.395**	−0.693**
	(0.10)	(−2.11)	(−2.95)	(−2.62)
2005	0.199	−0.318*	−0.504***	−0.618*
	(1.60)	(−2.20)	(−3.79)	(−2.36)
2006	−0.015	−0.428**	−0.700***	−1.158***
	(−0.12)	(−2.94)	(−5.28)	(−4.42)
2007	0.017	−0.396**	−0.629***	−1.009***
	(0.14)	(−2.72)	(−4.75)	(−3.83)
2008	−0.041	−0.326*	−0.441**	−0.804**
	(−0.33)	(−2.24)	(−3.33)	(−3.07)

Note. T statistics in parentheses.
*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

Table A8. Hosting Men's World Cup on the 3P Index.

	Prosecute	Protect	Prevent	Overall
Corruption	0.003	0.003	0.009	0.017
	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.32)	(0.29)
Women's Rights	0.043	−0.022	0.031	0.043
	(1.00)	(−0.45)	(0.67)	(0.48)
Property Rights	−0.003	−0.001	−0.002	−0.007
	(−1.23)	(−0.54)	(−0.78)	(−1.29)
Unemployment (Youth Female)	−0.000	−0.000	0.002	0.000
	(−0.24)	(−0.17)	(0.99)	(0.19)
Independent Judiciary	0.025	0.059	0.041	0.123
	(0.53)	(1.10)	(0.83)	(1.25)
Men's World Cup Host	0.893***	−0.037	0.778*	1.699**
	(5.10)	(−0.08)	(2.40)	(2.97)
Constant	0.117	0.466**	0.508***	1.115***
	(0.89)	(3.02)	(3.58)	(4.07)
Equation 2: Men's World Cup Host Selection				
Log of Population	0.592**	0.647***	0.653***	0.582**
	(3.67)	(3.47)	(3.60)	(3.25)
Log of GDP per Capita	0.106	0.180	0.157	0.168
	(0.69)	(1.00)	(0.96)	(1.04)
Log of Trade	0.076	−0.030	0.003	−0.003
	(0.24)	(−0.08)	(0.01)	(−0.01)
Government Revenue	0.024	0.021	0.022	0.024
	(1.70)	(1.24)	(1.43)	(1.57)
Constant	−6.135***	−6.538*	−6.527***	−6.428**
	(−2.85)	(−2.46)	(−2.68)	(2.70)
athrho	−1.214***	0.033	−0.633*	−0.839**
	(−5.17)	(0.11)	(−2.25)	(−2.83)
lnsigma	−0.375***	−0.268***	−0.336***	0.341***
	(−13.61)	(−10.20)	(−11.98)	(11.97)
Chi^2	26.77	0.01	5.06	7.99
Prob>Chi^2	.000	.915	.024	.004
N	724	724	724	724

Note. T statistics in parentheses.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Table A9. Men's World Cup Yearly Fixed Effects.

	Prosecute	Protect	Prevent	Overall
2002	0.320*	−0.212	−0.271	−0.153
	(2.37)	(−1.30)	(−1.82)	(−0.53)
2003	0.283*	−0.361*	−0.743***	−0.820**
	(2.24)	(−2.39)	(−5.36)	(−3.07)
2004	0.053	−0.310*	−0.347**	−0.622*
	(0.43)	(−2.11)	(−2.58)	(−2.39)
2005	0.229	−0.319*	−0.443***	−0.546*
	(1.89)	(−2.19)	(−3.34)	(−2.14)
2006	0.004	−0.429**	−0.682***	−1.112***
	(0.03)	(−2.93)	(−5.12)	(−4.32)
2007	0.050	−0.396**	−0.584***	−0.938***
	(0.41)	(−2.72)	(−4.38)	(−3.65)
2008	0.003	−0.326*	−0.395**	−0.724**
	(0.03)	(−2.23)	(−2.94)	(−2.79)

Note. T statistics in parentheses.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Table A10. Bidding for Mega-Event on the 3P Index.

	Prosecute	Protect	Prevent	Overall
Corruption	−0.003	−0.002	0.004	0.000
	(−0.12)	(−0.07)	(0.16)	(0.00)
Women's Rights	0.044	−0.023	0.033	0.054
	(1.02)	(−0.47)	(0.73)	(0.61)
Property Rights	−0.003	−0.001	−0.002	−0.007
	(−1.23)	(−0.60)	(−0.73)	(−1.27)
Unemployment (Youth Female)	−0.001	−0.000	0.001	0.000
	(−0.67)	(−0.04)	(0.90)	(0.02)
Independent Judiciary	0.020	0.060	0.037	0.124
	(0.43)	(1.12)	(0.74)	(1.27)
Mega-Event Bid	0.961***	0.784	0.780**	1.983***
	(4.79)	(1.93)	(3.10)	(4.52)
Constant	0.170	0.462**	0.528***	1.149***
	(1.26)	(2.98)	(3.70)	(4.12)
Equation 2: Mega-Event Bid Selection				
Log of Population	0.175	0.154	0.172	0.138
	(1.69)	(1.39)	(1.61)	(1.39)
Log of GDP per Capita	0.471**	0.476**	0.607***	0.549***
	(3.12)	(2.78)	(3.55)	(3.51)
Log of Trade	−0.062	−0.136	−0.142	−0.083
	(−0.23)	(−0.46)	(−0.50)	(−0.32)
Government Revenue	0.005	0.003	0.006	0.007
	(0.43)	(0.22)	(0.51)	(0.68)
Constant	−6.530***	−6.229**	−7.118***	−7.217***
	(−3.42)	(−3.07)	(−3.31)	(−3.59)
athrho	−0.918***	−0.659*	−0.755***	−1.087***
	(−4.64)	(−2.11)	(−3.56)	(−4.22)
lnsigma	−0.372***	−0.249***	−0.326***	0.359***
	(−13.05)	(−8.09)	(−11.33)	(12.26)
Chi^2	21.57	4.46	12.67	17.82
Prob>Chi^2	.000	.034	.000	.000
N	724	724	724	724

Note. T statistics in parentheses.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Table A11. Bid State Yearly Fixed Effects.

	Prosecute	Protect	Prevent	Overall
2002	0.321*	−0.204	−0.281	−0.186
	(2.27)	(−1.25)	(−1.87)	(−0.64)
2003	0.279*	−0.353*	−0.746***	−0.800**
	(2.14)	(−2.35)	(−5.40)	(−2.97)
2004	0.026	−0.290*	−0.341*	−0.586*
	(0.21)	(−1.98)	(−2.53)	(−2.23)
2005	0.217	−0.316*	−0.453***	−0.548*
	(1.73)	(−2.19)	(−3.41)	(−2.11)
2006	0.019	−0.408**	−0.666***	−1.042***
	(0.16)	(−2.79)	(−4.95)	(−3.97)
2007	0.035	−0.397**	−0.600***	−0.942***
	(0.28)	(−2.73)	(−4.50)	(−3.61)
2008	−0.026	−0.327*	−0.416**	−0.742**
	(−0.21)	(−2.25)	(−3.12)	(−2.84)

Note. T statistics in parentheses.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.